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<p>The proposed revision of the Swiss Banking Act introduces a public liquidity backstop (PLB) for distressed systemically important banks (SIBs), in part to facilitate resolution. We examine the impact of the PLB on fiscal balances, welfare, and the incentives of bank shareholders and management. A PLB, like too-big-to-fail (TBTF) status, acts as a subsidy for non-convertible bonds, which can create negative externalities. Corrective measures should be implemented before the PLB is activated to align incentives with societal interests. We conservatively estimate that UBS Group’s TBTF status results in funding cost reductions of at least USD 2.9 billion in 2022. The risk for Switzerland of hosting SIBs warrants additional precautionary savings.</p>

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Pricing liquidity support: a PLB for Switzerland

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年5月8日

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  • Remo Isch-Taudien,
  • Cyril Monnet,
  • Dirk Niepelt

摘要

The proposed revision of the Swiss Banking Act introduces a public liquidity backstop (PLB) for distressed systemically important banks (SIBs), in part to facilitate resolution. We examine the impact of the PLB on fiscal balances, welfare, and the incentives of bank shareholders and management. A PLB, like too-big-to-fail (TBTF) status, acts as a subsidy for non-convertible bonds, which can create negative externalities. Corrective measures should be implemented before the PLB is activated to align incentives with societal interests. We conservatively estimate that UBS Group’s TBTF status results in funding cost reductions of at least USD 2.9 billion in 2022. The risk for Switzerland of hosting SIBs warrants additional precautionary savings.