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Background <p>From 2022 to 2024, an annual, nationally representative, longitudinal survey in the United States (US) has found concerning prevalences of support for and willingness to engage in political violence. This study examines changes in those prevalences from mid-2024 to mid-2025.</p> Methods <p>Survey participants were members of Ipsos Knowledge Panel, ≥ 18 years old as of recruitment in 2022. Wave 4 was conducted May 23–June 13, 2025. The primary analysis generated findings for the entire cohort; a secondary analysis categorized respondents by political party and Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement affiliations. Principal outcome measures comprised measures of justification for, willingness to engage in, and expectation of firearm use in political violence. Results for 2025 were presented as weighted prevalences, with comparisons based on adjusted prevalence differences. Change from 2024 to 2025 was estimated based on mean change scores.</p> Results <p>The 2025 completion rate was 89.9% (8,248 respondents/9,179 invitees). For the cohort as a whole, there were only small increases from 2024 to 2025 in the prevalence of the belief that violence was usually or always justified to advance at least 1 of 20 political objectives (2024: 32.3%, 95% confidence interval (CI) 31.0%, 33.6%; 2025: 35.6%, 95% CI 34.1%, 37.0%) and to advance 16 of 20 individual objectives. There were few changes in willingness to commit political violence and none in expectation of firearm use. Despite some increases among Democrats, MAGA Republicans in 2025 were substantially more likely than strong Democrats to consider violence usually or always justified to advance at least 1 of 20 political objectives (MAGA Republicans 52.2%, 95% CI 48.4%, 56.1%; strong Democrats 32.1%, 95% CI 28.6%, 35.6%) and to advance 10 of those objectives when objectives were considered individually. A small group of non-Republican MAGA supporters had higher prevalences than most other groups on many measures.</p> Conclusions <p>Support for and willingness to commit political violence increased only modestly from 2024 to 2025 and, where differences existed, remained generally higher among MAGA movement affiliates and Republicans than among Democrats. These findings can help advance prevention efforts, which are urgently needed in this US election year.</p>

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Views on democracy and political violence in the United States in 2025: findings from a nationally representative survey

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年5月27日

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  • Garen J. Wintemute,
  • Sonia L. Robinson,
  • Andrew Crawford,
  • Julia P. Schleimer,
  • Daniel J. Tancredi,
  • Aaron B. Shev,
  • Elizabeth A. Tomsich,
  • Mona A. Wright,
  • Bradley Velasquez,
  • Shaina Sta. Cruz,
  • Veronica A. Pear

摘要

Background

From 2022 to 2024, an annual, nationally representative, longitudinal survey in the United States (US) has found concerning prevalences of support for and willingness to engage in political violence. This study examines changes in those prevalences from mid-2024 to mid-2025.

Methods

Survey participants were members of Ipsos Knowledge Panel, ≥ 18 years old as of recruitment in 2022. Wave 4 was conducted May 23–June 13, 2025. The primary analysis generated findings for the entire cohort; a secondary analysis categorized respondents by political party and Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement affiliations. Principal outcome measures comprised measures of justification for, willingness to engage in, and expectation of firearm use in political violence. Results for 2025 were presented as weighted prevalences, with comparisons based on adjusted prevalence differences. Change from 2024 to 2025 was estimated based on mean change scores.

Results

The 2025 completion rate was 89.9% (8,248 respondents/9,179 invitees). For the cohort as a whole, there were only small increases from 2024 to 2025 in the prevalence of the belief that violence was usually or always justified to advance at least 1 of 20 political objectives (2024: 32.3%, 95% confidence interval (CI) 31.0%, 33.6%; 2025: 35.6%, 95% CI 34.1%, 37.0%) and to advance 16 of 20 individual objectives. There were few changes in willingness to commit political violence and none in expectation of firearm use. Despite some increases among Democrats, MAGA Republicans in 2025 were substantially more likely than strong Democrats to consider violence usually or always justified to advance at least 1 of 20 political objectives (MAGA Republicans 52.2%, 95% CI 48.4%, 56.1%; strong Democrats 32.1%, 95% CI 28.6%, 35.6%) and to advance 10 of those objectives when objectives were considered individually. A small group of non-Republican MAGA supporters had higher prevalences than most other groups on many measures.

Conclusions

Support for and willingness to commit political violence increased only modestly from 2024 to 2025 and, where differences existed, remained generally higher among MAGA movement affiliates and Republicans than among Democrats. These findings can help advance prevention efforts, which are urgently needed in this US election year.