Abstract <p>Modern aviation has achieved unprecedented levels of safety, efficiency, and capacity through the pervasive integration of satellite-dependent technologies. Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) have become the cornerstone of area navigation, precision approach, and landing operations. Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS‑B) provides real‑time aircraft tracking to air traffic control, while High‑Frequency (HF) communication remains a critical backup over remote oceanic and polar regions. Collectively, these systems have enabled the transition to performance‑based navigation and the modernization of air traffic management. However, this technological dependence engenders a new and often underestimated vulnerability: all three systems rely on the propagation of radio waves through the ionosphere - a dynamic, plasma environment that is subject to abrupt and severe disturbances under enhanced solar activity. Ionospheric storms, which are direct consequences of geomagnetic storms, can simultaneously degrade GNSS positioning accuracy, induce loss of lock on satellite signals, corrupt ADS‑B messages, and black out HF communications within minutes. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has recognized this threat by establishing a global space weather service (since November 2019). Yet, as recent extreme events demonstrate—most notably the geomagnetic storm of May 10–13, 2024—current forecasting models, threat definitions, and mitigation strategies remain incomplete. Despite growing empirical evidence of operational impacts, the aviation community has largely treated ionospheric storms as a statistical curiosity rather than a tangible hazard requiring systematic risk management. The gap is particularly acute for safety‑critical phases of flight, including Category II/III precision approaches that rely on Ground‑Based Augmentation Systems (GBAS), and for operations in equatorial and high‑latitude corridors where scintillation and polar cap absorption are most intense. This paper provides a comprehensive, physically grounded analysis of ionospheric storm effects on aviation navigation, communication, and surveillance systems. We synthesize mechanisms of propagation delay, extreme total electron content (TEC) gradients, ionospheric scintillation, and solar radio burst interference. Using empirical data from the May 2024 superstorm—including ADS‑B anomaly analyses from the OpenSky Network—we quantify operational risks. We further assess the differential vulnerability of GBAS, polar routes, and equatorial aviation, and propose a prioritized roadmap for monitoring, forecasting, and mitigation within the ICAO space weather framework. The objective is to move the discourse from post‑factum reporting toward prognostic, resilience‑based risk management. This paper explains how storms in Earth’s upper atmosphere, caused by solar activity, can disrupt airplane navigation and communication systems. Using data from a major space weather event in May 2024, we show that these disruptions are not just theoretical but have already caused real problems for aircraft tracking and positioning. Understanding these risks helps the aviation industry prepare better for future solar storms and keep flights safe.</p>