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<p>Like many U.S. allies in Europe and around the world, Norway reacted to the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001 by declaring its sympathy with and support for the United States. The Norwegian avowal was based on genuine outrage and solidarity, but also national self-interest. In their determination to show that Norway is a good ally to the United States, Norwegian officials worried that being slow to offer military support could harm Oslo’s relations with Washington, D.C. Using archival documents hitherto unavailable to scholars, this article analyses Norway’s reaction to ‘9/11’ and, specifically, how Norwegian authorities arrived at the decision to contribute military forces to the military operations in Afghanistan, notably Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The questions asked include what assistance Norwegian authorities expected the United States would request, what role NATO was envisaged to play, how broad political support for military contributions was in Norway, and to what extent the future of Afghanistan was part of the planning.</p>

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Lest we should be the last: Norway and the road to Afghanistan, September–December 2001

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年2月6日

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  • Paal Sigurd Hilde

摘要

Like many U.S. allies in Europe and around the world, Norway reacted to the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001 by declaring its sympathy with and support for the United States. The Norwegian avowal was based on genuine outrage and solidarity, but also national self-interest. In their determination to show that Norway is a good ally to the United States, Norwegian officials worried that being slow to offer military support could harm Oslo’s relations with Washington, D.C. Using archival documents hitherto unavailable to scholars, this article analyses Norway’s reaction to ‘9/11’ and, specifically, how Norwegian authorities arrived at the decision to contribute military forces to the military operations in Afghanistan, notably Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The questions asked include what assistance Norwegian authorities expected the United States would request, what role NATO was envisaged to play, how broad political support for military contributions was in Norway, and to what extent the future of Afghanistan was part of the planning.