<p>In many respects, Germany was not very likely to be a major partner in the 2001 US-led War on Terror and the Afghanistan intervention. Why did she end up with a military and political participation much larger than that of her closest continental security partner, France? Based on (previously) classified documents and applying a Bureaucratic Politics approach, I demonstrate that the German government was not interested in Afghanistan or the War on Terror as such and that solidarity with the US only partly explains its engagement. Instead, I argue that the institutional stakes of the actors involved in the foreign policy decision-making process accounted for the participation and extent of the German contribution to the intervention. In particular, Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schröder attempted to create a political legacy in line with post-war German foreign policy. Accordingly, he tried to utilise the situation after “9/11” to achieve eye level with France and Great Britain in international security policy. Specifically, he tried to demonstrate to the US that through the EU, Germany could serve as a power that could enable and mobilise the forces of Europe and Russia. Decision-makers at the Federal Foreign Office agreed and focused on participating prominently in a post-Taliban political process, as this underscored the relevance of their institution. The leadership of the Federal Ministry of Defence was most reluctant to make a military contribution, thereby preventing an even larger engagement as envisioned by the German chief of defence, who gained institutional power and therefore supported the War on Terror. To win the support of critical members of parliament, the German government depicted and conceptualised the Afghan mission as peaceful and limited. All in all, the eventual German policy was a compromise between Schröder’s “unrestricted solidarity” and the reluctant stance of institutionally opposing forces.</p>