<p>Between August and September 1984, the U.S., Great Britain, France and Italy deployed naval units in the Red Sea to counter a sea-mine threat. While minor in scale, the joint mission gains historiographical significance as the first, clear instance of post-Multinational Force for Beirut (MNF) transatlantic military operation. Unlike the mission in Lebanon, Western nations acted autonomously, avoiding a unified command and conducting their minehunting tasks under strict national authority. Drawing on newly available archival sources, this study uses Italy’s decision-making prior and during the naval operations in the Red Sea as a case study to assess the impact of the MNF demise on subsequent Western military interventions in the Mediterranean and Middle East. The analysis reveals a marked shift in Italy’s security policy, characterised by growing reluctance to engage in military cooperation outside NATO’s institutional framework. The Red Sea mission also exposed the lingering scars of the MNF failure, as Italy—motivated by deep mistrust towards the increasing militarisation of U.S. Middle East policy—deliberately distanced itself from American strategic decisions, even at the risk of weakening transatlantic ties.</p>