<p>There are growing signs that the world order is changing, as China’s power rises and the United States (US) steps back from aspects of global leadership. This commentary examines three alternative world orders that may emerge from this shift, as well as the strategies that companies of various types should undertake in each scenario. The world orders considered are: (1) bipolarity, characterized by rivalry and bloc formation between the US and China; (2) dual hegemony, in which the US and China each provide complementary global public goods in ways that sustain economic openness; and (3) power transition, in which China displaces the US as the dominant hegemonic power. After outlining each scenario, we analyze the implications for export-oriented producers, import-competing firms, and multinational enterprises (MNEs). We argue that export-oriented producers and MNEs are generally disadvantaged under bipolarity, advantaged under dual hegemony, and face near-term disruption under power transition, though they may benefit in the long run if a stable China-led order emerges. Import-competing firms experience the opposite pattern: they are winners under bipolarity, losers under dual hegemony, and near-term beneficiaries in a power transition scenario. We provide strategies that firms of each type should use to mitigate geopolitical risks and seize market opportunities.</p>

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US–China power dynamics and business strategies

  • Robert Grosse,
  • Jonas Gamso

摘要

There are growing signs that the world order is changing, as China’s power rises and the United States (US) steps back from aspects of global leadership. This commentary examines three alternative world orders that may emerge from this shift, as well as the strategies that companies of various types should undertake in each scenario. The world orders considered are: (1) bipolarity, characterized by rivalry and bloc formation between the US and China; (2) dual hegemony, in which the US and China each provide complementary global public goods in ways that sustain economic openness; and (3) power transition, in which China displaces the US as the dominant hegemonic power. After outlining each scenario, we analyze the implications for export-oriented producers, import-competing firms, and multinational enterprises (MNEs). We argue that export-oriented producers and MNEs are generally disadvantaged under bipolarity, advantaged under dual hegemony, and face near-term disruption under power transition, though they may benefit in the long run if a stable China-led order emerges. Import-competing firms experience the opposite pattern: they are winners under bipolarity, losers under dual hegemony, and near-term beneficiaries in a power transition scenario. We provide strategies that firms of each type should use to mitigate geopolitical risks and seize market opportunities.