Scholarlink

<p>The accumulation of end-of-life power batteries (PBs) from electric vehicles (EVs) necessitates effective management strategies that balance economic viability with environmental responsibility. While government intervention and stakeholder cooperation are widely advocated, their interplay in shaping supply chain performance remains unclear. This study develops a game-theoretic model featuring a PB supplier, an EV manufacturer, and a third-party recycler to investigate optimal alliance strategies under both laissez-faire and carrot-and-stick regulatory scenarios. Five alliance modes are examined: no alliance, three partial alliances (supplier–manufacturer, manufacturer–recycler, supplier–recycler), and the entire-alliance mode. The results show that: (i) among partial alliances, the optimal choice depends on recycling difficulty and policy intensity. The manufacturer–recycler (supplier–manufacturer) alliance becomes a dominated strategy when recycling is less (more) challenging; (ii) the carrot-and-stick mechanism exhibits asymmetric effectiveness, enhancing welfare in most structures, while failing in the no-alliance and supplier–recycler modes; and (iii) the entire-alliance mode maximizes profit and social welfare but incurs the highest environmental impact due to expanded production, while the carrot-and-stick mechanism can prevent it from incurring the highest environmental impact. These findings reveal an inherent trade-off between profitability and sustainability, offering actionable guidance for strategic partner selection and a framework for regulators to calibrate interventions based on industry maturity.</p>

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To cooperate or not? Recycling alliances and the carrot-and-stick mechanism

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2026年7月14日

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  • Junfei Ding,
  • Junhao Xia,
  • Tianying Du

摘要

The accumulation of end-of-life power batteries (PBs) from electric vehicles (EVs) necessitates effective management strategies that balance economic viability with environmental responsibility. While government intervention and stakeholder cooperation are widely advocated, their interplay in shaping supply chain performance remains unclear. This study develops a game-theoretic model featuring a PB supplier, an EV manufacturer, and a third-party recycler to investigate optimal alliance strategies under both laissez-faire and carrot-and-stick regulatory scenarios. Five alliance modes are examined: no alliance, three partial alliances (supplier–manufacturer, manufacturer–recycler, supplier–recycler), and the entire-alliance mode. The results show that: (i) among partial alliances, the optimal choice depends on recycling difficulty and policy intensity. The manufacturer–recycler (supplier–manufacturer) alliance becomes a dominated strategy when recycling is less (more) challenging; (ii) the carrot-and-stick mechanism exhibits asymmetric effectiveness, enhancing welfare in most structures, while failing in the no-alliance and supplier–recycler modes; and (iii) the entire-alliance mode maximizes profit and social welfare but incurs the highest environmental impact due to expanded production, while the carrot-and-stick mechanism can prevent it from incurring the highest environmental impact. These findings reveal an inherent trade-off between profitability and sustainability, offering actionable guidance for strategic partner selection and a framework for regulators to calibrate interventions based on industry maturity.