<p>Prefabricated construction, a sustainable approach with energy-saving and eco-friendly benefits, still faces challenges like information security risks, transparency issues, and regulatory difficulties. Blockchain technology, with its features of data security and traceability, offers a novel solution to these issues. This study constructs an evolutionary game model involving government, contractors, and subcontractors to explore blockchain-enabled information sharing. We derive evolutionarily stable strategies and their conditions, then employ numerical simulations to examine how these strategies evolve under different scenarios, along with key parameters’ effects on system equilibrium. The findings show that government play distinct roles across the lifecycle of blockchain-enabled information sharing in prefabricated construction: as advocates initially, facilitators during the growth and maturity phases, and gradually withdrawing as the market stabilizes. Furthermore, the study reveals that governmental incentive-penalty mechanisms, enterprise costs, and information sharing risks significantly influence strategic decisions in blockchain-enabled information sharing. Both extremely high and low subsidy-penalty ratios are found to inhibit corporate participation. Notably, when maintaining equivalent information sharing levels, moderately reducing initial disclosure volumes paradoxically enhances collaborative willingness among enterprises. Finally, this paper provides recommendations for government, contractors, and subcontractors to promote blockchain-enabled information sharing in prefabricated construction, contributing valuable insights for fostering sustainable and collaborative practices in the industry.</p>