<p>It is well-established that phenomenology is about both existent and imaginary entities. The latter category encompasses necessary beings, hypothetical objects, possible objects, and modal properties. Given the vast range of potential intentional objects for intentional states, the total number of such mental states would vastly exceed the number of possible physical states. This raises a critical question: How can such an excess of mental states supervene on a comparatively limited physical substrate? I contend that this numerical transcendence of noema is fundamentally incompatible with the principle of supervenience. This argument offers an alternative formulation of those advanced by Abelson and Porpora, rooted in the mind’s capacity to entertain thoughts about natural numbers. Furthermore, the consciousness problem may necessitate trialism rather than dualism, as necessary beings, hypothetical objects, and similar entities constitute a distinct ontological category separate from both minds and physical objects—a line of inquiry reserved for future research. This study will advance the discussion of consciousness and includes an accurate characterization of the triple elements and the separate category of minds and physical objects, for the creativity of the mind needs novel entities.</p>