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<p>To address the diminishing marginal effects of government subsidies and the lack of regulatory synergy in agricultural green supply chains, this study divides revenue heterogeneity into five representative scenarios: subsidy-dependent, regulation-driven, self-motivated, externally constrained, and subsidy-withdrawal, and develops a multi-scenario evolutionary game model involving two agents: the government (incentive/non-incentive) and agricultural entities (high-effort/low-effort). The results indicate that in the early subsidy-dependent and regulation-driven stages, government subsidies and regulatory mechanisms exhibit strong synergistic effects, effectively enhancing producers’ effort levels and green investments. However, as the market matures into the self-motivated and subsidy-withdrawal stages, internal enterprise incentives and market adjustment mechanisms become dominant, and the marginal impact of government policies declines. Sensitivity analysis and parameter simulation further reveal the optimal balance among subsidy intensity, regulatory strength, and market returns. This study not only provides a quantifiable theoretical basis for the design of green agricultural policies but also offers practical insights for governments to achieve a phased transition from “supportive intervention” to “strategic withdrawal” in green supply chain governance.</p>

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Dynamic coordination of policy subsidies and regulatory mechanisms for green agricultural supply chains based on multiple revenue scenarios

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年4月24日

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  • Yinglin Wang,
  • Mengnan Chen,
  • Yiting Lin,
  • Xinxi Zhang,
  • Shengxu Shi

摘要

To address the diminishing marginal effects of government subsidies and the lack of regulatory synergy in agricultural green supply chains, this study divides revenue heterogeneity into five representative scenarios: subsidy-dependent, regulation-driven, self-motivated, externally constrained, and subsidy-withdrawal, and develops a multi-scenario evolutionary game model involving two agents: the government (incentive/non-incentive) and agricultural entities (high-effort/low-effort). The results indicate that in the early subsidy-dependent and regulation-driven stages, government subsidies and regulatory mechanisms exhibit strong synergistic effects, effectively enhancing producers’ effort levels and green investments. However, as the market matures into the self-motivated and subsidy-withdrawal stages, internal enterprise incentives and market adjustment mechanisms become dominant, and the marginal impact of government policies declines. Sensitivity analysis and parameter simulation further reveal the optimal balance among subsidy intensity, regulatory strength, and market returns. This study not only provides a quantifiable theoretical basis for the design of green agricultural policies but also offers practical insights for governments to achieve a phased transition from “supportive intervention” to “strategic withdrawal” in green supply chain governance.