Stick rather than carrot: the impact of imbalance of rewards and punishments on the inaction of Chinese grassroots civil servants
摘要
Grassroots civil servants’ (GCSs) inaction has emerged as a critical challenge demanding immediate attention in China’s public administration. This study examines how the imbalance of rewards and punishments (IRP), characterized by reward omission and non-contingent punishment, contributes to GCS inaction. To this end, a three-wave questionnaire survey was conducted among 329 Chinese GCSs, with each wave separated by a 1-month interval. Through moderated mediation analysis and fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA), the results demonstrate that IRP positively affects GCS inaction via a parallel mediating mechanism involving work alienation and risk perception. Moreover, public service motivation (PSM) negatively moderates the entire mediating process. The fsQCA findings further reveal three distinct antecedent configurations associated with GCS inaction: (1) the presence of non-contingent punishment coupled with the absence of PSM; (2) the coexistence of non-contingent punishment and work alienation at higher position levels; and (3) the paradoxical combination of work alienation and PSM at higher position levels. The results of the three configurations further confirm that high IRP (especially non-contingent punishment), high work alienation and low PSM (except for configuration 3) are the core coupling factors that trigger the inaction of GCSs. These insights provide valuable policy implications for tackling and mitigating inaction among GCSs, emphasizing the critical need to develop effective reward and incentive mechanisms and to refine the accountability and risk management systems for civil servants.