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<p>Social insurance contribution evasion is a pervasive issue, particularly in China, with significant socioeconomic repercussions. This study develops a tripartite evolutionary game model involving local governments, enterprises, and employees to explore evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) under various scenarios. We identify four potential ESS within the game system, with the final outcome depending on central government rewards for local governments’ enforcement efforts, penalties imposed by enterprises on employees for work indolence, and employee reciprocity toward compliant enterprises. When these three parameters exceed critical thresholds, the system converges toward an optimal strategy combination characterized by strict collection, compliant contribution, and active engagement. Measures that can accelerate convergence toward the ideal equilibrium include reducing the cost of strict collection, increasing penalties for non-compliant enterprises, strengthening employee whistleblowing incentives, and lowering social insurance contributions. These findings offer valuable insights for policymakers to curb contribution evasion.</p>

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Understanding social insurance contribution evasion through evolutionary game theory: insights from China

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2026年2月25日

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  • Minglu Wang,
  • Yifan Pan,
  • Peng Jing

摘要

Social insurance contribution evasion is a pervasive issue, particularly in China, with significant socioeconomic repercussions. This study develops a tripartite evolutionary game model involving local governments, enterprises, and employees to explore evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) under various scenarios. We identify four potential ESS within the game system, with the final outcome depending on central government rewards for local governments’ enforcement efforts, penalties imposed by enterprises on employees for work indolence, and employee reciprocity toward compliant enterprises. When these three parameters exceed critical thresholds, the system converges toward an optimal strategy combination characterized by strict collection, compliant contribution, and active engagement. Measures that can accelerate convergence toward the ideal equilibrium include reducing the cost of strict collection, increasing penalties for non-compliant enterprises, strengthening employee whistleblowing incentives, and lowering social insurance contributions. These findings offer valuable insights for policymakers to curb contribution evasion.