<p>Given the steady progress toward carbon neutrality targets, the sports industry, as a high-carbon-emission sector, is facing significant carbon emission reduction (CER) pressures and transformation challenges. How to incentivize its green transition has become a common concern in both academic and practical circles. Although existing studies have explored the impact of carbon trading policies on various industries, research on low-carbon product development decisions in the sports manufacturing industry remains relatively limited. To address this research gap, this study constructs game-theoretic models under two scenarios: one without government carbon trading policy implementation and one with carbon trading policy implementation. These models include ordinary sports manufacturers (OSMs) and sports retailers (SRs). The results indicate the following: (1) Compared with not investing in CER, investing in CER simultaneously improves OSMs’ CER effort, product price, sales volume, and profit. However, as the abatement-investment coefficient increases, marginal profit decreases, indicating the existence of an optimal CER interval. (2) The effectiveness of the carbon trading policy depends on the product’s initial carbon emissions and the total carbon cap. If the initial emissions exceed a certain threshold, the policy reduces the market transaction volume and SRs’ profit. Conversely, if the total cap is above a given threshold, OSMs benefit from increased output and quota trading. (3) The market transaction volume, manufacturer profit, and retailer profit all concurrently enter a growth phase when the consumer-preference coefficient reaches a significant threshold.</p>