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<p>Since its inception in 2017, the Electoral Bonds scheme has faced ongoing criticism for its flawed framework, risking quid pro quo, crony capitalism, and undermining fair &amp; fair elections. This paper leverages the newly available data to identify four distinct forms of corruption facilitated by the scheme. Section 1 examines the phenomenon of “chanda do, dhanda lo” (give donation and get business), where newly established and other corporate entities rapidly channel substantial funds to political parties. Section 2 investigates instances of “hafta-vasuli” (extortion), wherein ruling parties exploit law enforcement agencies to target corporate entities, subsequently receiving significant political funding from the raided companies. Section 3 explores the dynamics of “theka lo, rishwat do” (bag contract, give bribe), revealing implicit quid pro quo relationships between parties and corporates in exchange for funding and contracts. Lastly, Section 4 highlights the existence of “Farzi companies” (fake companies) through which illicit funds flow to parties.</p>

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Behind the curtain: unravelling corruption in the electoral bonds scheme

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年12月17日

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  • Devendra Poola,
  • Vinitha Anna John

摘要

Since its inception in 2017, the Electoral Bonds scheme has faced ongoing criticism for its flawed framework, risking quid pro quo, crony capitalism, and undermining fair & fair elections. This paper leverages the newly available data to identify four distinct forms of corruption facilitated by the scheme. Section 1 examines the phenomenon of “chanda do, dhanda lo” (give donation and get business), where newly established and other corporate entities rapidly channel substantial funds to political parties. Section 2 investigates instances of “hafta-vasuli” (extortion), wherein ruling parties exploit law enforcement agencies to target corporate entities, subsequently receiving significant political funding from the raided companies. Section 3 explores the dynamics of “theka lo, rishwat do” (bag contract, give bribe), revealing implicit quid pro quo relationships between parties and corporates in exchange for funding and contracts. Lastly, Section 4 highlights the existence of “Farzi companies” (fake companies) through which illicit funds flow to parties.