Scholarlink

<p>This study examines the impact of common institutional ownership on corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&amp;A) within China’s emerging market. The findings suggest that, while common institutional ownership decreases the likelihood of M&amp;A, it positively influences the merger announcement effect and merger performance. The heterogeneity analysis reveals that long-term and independent institutional investors play a more significant role in facilitating effective M&amp;A. The mechanism analysis identifies two primary channels through which common institutional ownership exerts its influence: first, by leveraging acquisition experience and informational advantages to mitigate information asymmetry; second, by appointing directors and curbing managerial opportunism to strengthen corporate governance. These findings provide novel empirical evidence regarding the dual role of common institutional ownership in M&amp;A, enriching the literature on its economic impact in emerging markets. Furthermore, they offer valuable insights for advancing well-structured M&amp;A practices and refining capital market regulations.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

Governance or collusion? The M&A effects of common institutional ownership

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2025年6月18日

查看全文
  • Fangfang Zhou,
  • Lianghua Chen,
  • Libin Zhao,
  • Xiangfei Fu

摘要

This study examines the impact of common institutional ownership on corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&A) within China’s emerging market. The findings suggest that, while common institutional ownership decreases the likelihood of M&A, it positively influences the merger announcement effect and merger performance. The heterogeneity analysis reveals that long-term and independent institutional investors play a more significant role in facilitating effective M&A. The mechanism analysis identifies two primary channels through which common institutional ownership exerts its influence: first, by leveraging acquisition experience and informational advantages to mitigate information asymmetry; second, by appointing directors and curbing managerial opportunism to strengthen corporate governance. These findings provide novel empirical evidence regarding the dual role of common institutional ownership in M&A, enriching the literature on its economic impact in emerging markets. Furthermore, they offer valuable insights for advancing well-structured M&A practices and refining capital market regulations.