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<p>This study explores low-carbon promotion competition between dual-channel green manufacturers and retailers against the backdrop of global low-carbon economic transformation and deepening green consumption preferences, aiming to uncover whether low-carbon competition drives the low-carbon transformation of supply chain enterprises. It also analyzes the equilibrium choices and coordination strategies of green manufacturers and retailers in low-carbon promotion competition. To achieve this, the study creates base models of centralized (C) and decentralized (D) low-carbon promotion competitions without government subsidies, followed by a low-carbon promotion competition model with government subsidies (DG). In the expanded models, a unilateral cost-sharing contract (CSG-S) and a bidirectional cost-sharing contract (CSG-D) are added to investigate supply chain collaborative optimization routes in low-carbon competitive settings. Finally, numerical simulations use fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) industry background data to support comparative analysis. Results show that green manufacturers have significant advantages in low-carbon promotion competition (under D and DG models). However, low-carbon competition can also moderately erode green brands’ profits, reputation, and emission reduction capabilities, impeding low-carbon transformation progress—there exists a risk of greenwashing in low-carbon promotion investments under competitive scenarios, but government low-carbon subsidies can further promote the reduction of carbon emission levels. As the DG, CSG-S, and CSG-D models gradually coordinate, the market demand gap between green manufacturers and retailers narrows, ultimately achieving mutual benefit among supply chain members, resolving low-carbon promotion competition conflicts, and facilitating synchronized development between low-carbon transformation and economic returns for both parties. This research provides a practical decision-making framework for governments to design targeted subsidy policies and for enterprises to formulate low-carbon competition strategies.</p>

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Research on whether low-carbon competition accelerates low-carbon transition and coordination strategies in the context of “dual carbon”

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年7月1日

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  • Huiqin Zhang,
  • Deru Xie,
  • Jianmin Xie,
  • Yuxiang Zhang

摘要

This study explores low-carbon promotion competition between dual-channel green manufacturers and retailers against the backdrop of global low-carbon economic transformation and deepening green consumption preferences, aiming to uncover whether low-carbon competition drives the low-carbon transformation of supply chain enterprises. It also analyzes the equilibrium choices and coordination strategies of green manufacturers and retailers in low-carbon promotion competition. To achieve this, the study creates base models of centralized (C) and decentralized (D) low-carbon promotion competitions without government subsidies, followed by a low-carbon promotion competition model with government subsidies (DG). In the expanded models, a unilateral cost-sharing contract (CSG-S) and a bidirectional cost-sharing contract (CSG-D) are added to investigate supply chain collaborative optimization routes in low-carbon competitive settings. Finally, numerical simulations use fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) industry background data to support comparative analysis. Results show that green manufacturers have significant advantages in low-carbon promotion competition (under D and DG models). However, low-carbon competition can also moderately erode green brands’ profits, reputation, and emission reduction capabilities, impeding low-carbon transformation progress—there exists a risk of greenwashing in low-carbon promotion investments under competitive scenarios, but government low-carbon subsidies can further promote the reduction of carbon emission levels. As the DG, CSG-S, and CSG-D models gradually coordinate, the market demand gap between green manufacturers and retailers narrows, ultimately achieving mutual benefit among supply chain members, resolving low-carbon promotion competition conflicts, and facilitating synchronized development between low-carbon transformation and economic returns for both parties. This research provides a practical decision-making framework for governments to design targeted subsidy policies and for enterprises to formulate low-carbon competition strategies.