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<p>China’s increasingly assertive use of sharp power has become central to its coercive diplomacy toward states challenging its core political interests. This article analyzes the strategic logic and mechanisms behind China’s shift from soft to sharp power, as illustrated by the 2021–2023 Sino-Lithuanian dispute. Drawing on theories of economic statecraft and asymmetric interdependence, the study argues that Beijing deploys sharp power when sovereignty sensitivities and political asymmetry intersect and when coercion can be applied at low strategic cost. Despite Lithuania’s small size and limited economic exposure, China’s strategy, encompassing diplomatic downgrades, supply-chain weaponization, pressure on multinational firms, and information operations, failed to secure a policy reversal. Lithuania’s resilience, EU backing, and China’s own reputational constraints on excessive coercion limited Beijing’s leverage. Empirically, the case demonstrates how coercive escalation can become counterproductive under conditions of low vulnerability and multilateral shielding. The findings highlight broader implications for European strategic autonomy, the politicization of supply chains, and the future trajectory of authoritarian sharp power in a fragmenting international order.</p>

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China’s transition to sharp power: economic coercion and diplomatic isolation in Lithuania

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年7月11日

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  • Mordechai Chaziza

摘要

China’s increasingly assertive use of sharp power has become central to its coercive diplomacy toward states challenging its core political interests. This article analyzes the strategic logic and mechanisms behind China’s shift from soft to sharp power, as illustrated by the 2021–2023 Sino-Lithuanian dispute. Drawing on theories of economic statecraft and asymmetric interdependence, the study argues that Beijing deploys sharp power when sovereignty sensitivities and political asymmetry intersect and when coercion can be applied at low strategic cost. Despite Lithuania’s small size and limited economic exposure, China’s strategy, encompassing diplomatic downgrades, supply-chain weaponization, pressure on multinational firms, and information operations, failed to secure a policy reversal. Lithuania’s resilience, EU backing, and China’s own reputational constraints on excessive coercion limited Beijing’s leverage. Empirically, the case demonstrates how coercive escalation can become counterproductive under conditions of low vulnerability and multilateral shielding. The findings highlight broader implications for European strategic autonomy, the politicization of supply chains, and the future trajectory of authoritarian sharp power in a fragmenting international order.