Governance through compensation: how credit ratings shape executive pay in India
摘要
This study investigates the relationship between executive compensation and credit rating movements in the Indian listed firms. While prior research extensively links executive pay to firm performance, profitability, and size, the influence of credit ratings a proxy for financial stability and risk on the managerial compensation has received limited attention. Using a panel of Indian listed firms, from 2010 to 2023, we analyze how changes in credit ratings, including upgrades and downgrades, affect the CEO compensation structures. Our findings reveal a positive association between credit rating upgrades and executive pay. Notably, ratings transitioning around the boundary between investment and speculative grades show significant effects, highlighting the strategic use of compensation in response to shifts in perceived firm risk. This study contributes into the association of credit rating and executive pay, particularly in emerging markets, showing that firms adjust executive compensation in response to shifts in risk captured by credit rating.