<p>This study examines whether corporate governance mechanisms affect firms’ financial performance in an emerging-market setting, focusing on Moroccan listed companies over 2014–2024. Using panel-data models—static (OLS, fixed and random effects, 2SLS) and dynamic (system GMM)—we address endogeneity and persistence in performance. We consider both accounting- and market-based outcomes (ROE, MVA, and Tobin’s Q) and control for the exogenous Covid-19 shock with a dedicated dummy and split-sample tests (pre-/during–post Covid). Results show that board size, the presence of an audit committee, and board meeting frequency are positively associated with performance across specifications, while CEO–chair duality is generally insignificant. Board independence displays mixed effects—significant for MVA but not for ROE—highlighting differences between market and accounting metrics. Additional analyses by industry, firm size, and firm age confirm the robustness and reveal context-specific heterogeneity. These findings contribute new evidence from Morocco, where family control, state shareholdings, and cross-shareholdings shape governance practices, and they offer practical guidance for regulators and investors: strengthening active board monitoring mechanisms is associated with better firm outcomes, including during periods of macroeconomic stress.</p>

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The impact of corporate governance on financial performance in emerging markets: empirical evidence from Morocco

  • Anouar Faiteh,
  • Mohammed Rachid Aasri,
  • Hicham Ouakil,
  • Mohamed Hosni,
  • Zakaria Ez-zarzari,
  • Zineb Farabi

摘要

This study examines whether corporate governance mechanisms affect firms’ financial performance in an emerging-market setting, focusing on Moroccan listed companies over 2014–2024. Using panel-data models—static (OLS, fixed and random effects, 2SLS) and dynamic (system GMM)—we address endogeneity and persistence in performance. We consider both accounting- and market-based outcomes (ROE, MVA, and Tobin’s Q) and control for the exogenous Covid-19 shock with a dedicated dummy and split-sample tests (pre-/during–post Covid). Results show that board size, the presence of an audit committee, and board meeting frequency are positively associated with performance across specifications, while CEO–chair duality is generally insignificant. Board independence displays mixed effects—significant for MVA but not for ROE—highlighting differences between market and accounting metrics. Additional analyses by industry, firm size, and firm age confirm the robustness and reveal context-specific heterogeneity. These findings contribute new evidence from Morocco, where family control, state shareholdings, and cross-shareholdings shape governance practices, and they offer practical guidance for regulators and investors: strengthening active board monitoring mechanisms is associated with better firm outcomes, including during periods of macroeconomic stress.