<p>A growing body of research has identified the revolving door, or the movement of personnel between government and private sector lobbying, as a source of corporate influence in policymaking processes. However, studies vary in how they define and empirically measure revolving door lobbyists across different institutions and populations, producing fragmented explanations for how lobbyists’ social and professional backgrounds influence policymaking processes. This study develops a career trajectory approach to identifying revolving door lobbyists, which improves upon prior approaches by (1) measuring multiple types of revolving door sequences, differentiating between “single-revolvers” and “super-revolvers,” (2) detecting unreported lobbying work, (3) describing how characteristics of revolving door lobbyists vary across type, and (4) distinguishing how different types of private sector organizations are represented in revolving door career trajectories. I illustrate this approach through descriptive sequence analysis of the careers of bureaucrats employed by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) from 2001 to 2020 (<i>n</i> = 658). Over half of all employees (52.3%) have revolved in some form between lobbying and public office, and a third of these individuals are “super-revolvers.” Less than one-third of these individuals were formally registered as lobbyists. The findings uncover significant heterogeneity in career trajectories, as well as potential biases and gaps in existing studies of revolving door lobbyists.</p>