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<p>What explains whom to lobby in constitutional assemblies or conventions? We present a model that leads to the expectation that ideological, social and ethnic affinities may induce deliberations among allies and acquaintances. We examine the case of Chile and test the implications of our model with data on lobbying exchanges at the failed Constitutional Convention (2021–2022). The results show that cause lobbies (i.e., environmentalists, sexual and gender minorities, human rights) focus more on leftists’ delegates of the Constitutional Convention. Meanwhile, sectional lobbies (i.e., companies, economic groups) avoid more extreme leftists’ representatives. Against our expectation, previous ties to social movements and reserved seats do not anticipate more lobbying from those groups.</p>

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Echo chamber? Lobbying at the failed Chilean constitutional convention

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年7月5日

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  • Andrés Dockendorff,
  • Rodrigo Cuevas Ossandón

摘要

What explains whom to lobby in constitutional assemblies or conventions? We present a model that leads to the expectation that ideological, social and ethnic affinities may induce deliberations among allies and acquaintances. We examine the case of Chile and test the implications of our model with data on lobbying exchanges at the failed Constitutional Convention (2021–2022). The results show that cause lobbies (i.e., environmentalists, sexual and gender minorities, human rights) focus more on leftists’ delegates of the Constitutional Convention. Meanwhile, sectional lobbies (i.e., companies, economic groups) avoid more extreme leftists’ representatives. Against our expectation, previous ties to social movements and reserved seats do not anticipate more lobbying from those groups.