<p>Lobbying registers are publicly searchable interfaces that publish information on the lobbying landscape. An emerging body of research has explored how lobbyists strategically consume lobbying register data to inform their advocacy. However, we know exceedingly little of how those on the demand side of the process—policy-makers—engage with these regulatory tools. Employing novel survey data on policy-makers in Ireland and France, this paper explores how policy-makers engage with lobbying registers and their data, and if differences exist between national contexts in how they view the effects of transparency or informally ‘enforce’ the rules. Our results highlight that a large cohort of policy-makers actively and strategically engage with lobbying registers for a variety of purposes, and that state-level differences exist in how policy-makers perceive the impact of lobbying register transparency on their engagements with interest groups. State context also matters for policy-makers engaging with known previously non-compliant groups. Our findings not only shed light on the consultation habits of policy-makers, but signal a greater need to understand how lobbying registers are realised in practice in alternative states, rather than just exploring their on paper differences.</p>

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How do policy-makers engage with lobbying registers? Evidence from Ireland and France

  • Alexander Fitzpatrick,
  • David Coen

摘要

Lobbying registers are publicly searchable interfaces that publish information on the lobbying landscape. An emerging body of research has explored how lobbyists strategically consume lobbying register data to inform their advocacy. However, we know exceedingly little of how those on the demand side of the process—policy-makers—engage with these regulatory tools. Employing novel survey data on policy-makers in Ireland and France, this paper explores how policy-makers engage with lobbying registers and their data, and if differences exist between national contexts in how they view the effects of transparency or informally ‘enforce’ the rules. Our results highlight that a large cohort of policy-makers actively and strategically engage with lobbying registers for a variety of purposes, and that state-level differences exist in how policy-makers perceive the impact of lobbying register transparency on their engagements with interest groups. State context also matters for policy-makers engaging with known previously non-compliant groups. Our findings not only shed light on the consultation habits of policy-makers, but signal a greater need to understand how lobbying registers are realised in practice in alternative states, rather than just exploring their on paper differences.