The carrot and stick approach: exploring the advantages and limits of the EU’s transparency register from a practitioner’s point of view

As more laws emerge in the EU’s member states that regulate lobbying, this growing trend also warrants a closer look at how lobbying regulation at EU level has evolved, not least since some of the new lobbying registers have looked to the EU’s system for inspiration. The European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission signed an inter-institutional agreement on a mandatory transparency register on 20 May 2021 (OJ L 207, 11.6.2021, p. 1–17) with an accompanying political statement (OJ L 207, 11.6.2021, p. 18–18), effectively making prior registration a condition for certain interest representation activities. Since the Parliament and the Commission first joined forces in their efforts to shed light on interest representation, advocacy and all other types of lobbying in 2011, their goal has not changed fundamentally. However, the appetite for transparent decision-making and accountability both on the side of the decision-makers and on the public scrutiny side has grown alongside wider efforts to ensure the resilience of democratic structures and processes in uncertain times. In this context, this paper examines what the EU institutions’ transparency register can and cannot do, how the EU’s institutions achieve compliance with their carrot and stick approach and how the new conditionality principle introduced in 2021 makes registration de facto mandatory for interest representatives seeking to influence policy and decision-making of the Parliament, the Council and the Commission.