<p>Technocrats are often regarded as an alternative means of enhancing governance capacity during times of crisis, yet scholarly attention to their tenure stability within government cabinets remains limited. Drawing on cross-national ministerial appointment data from 30 European countries between 2000 and 2022, this article employs event history analysis (Kaplan–Meier estimates and stratified Cox models) to examine the risk of early exit among technocratic ministers during a government’s term. The findings show that technocrats are, on average, more likely than partisan ministers to leave office before the government’s termination. However, this vulnerability is conditional: it increases when populist parties are present in parliament, when the party system shows medium levels of fractionalization, and when technocrats hold high-salience portfolios such as finance, core social policy, or EU affairs.&#xa0;By contrast, Cabinet type and routine economic fluctuations are not robust predictors of technocratic turnover. The study shifts the focus of the technocracy literature from who is appointed to who endures, demonstrating that technical expertise alone does not ensure tenure stability. Rather, survival depends on partisan support, institutionalized coalition governance, and clear boundaries of accountability.</p>

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Governing on loan: conditional risks of early exit for technocratic ministers in Europe

  • Zhang Yiwen

摘要

Technocrats are often regarded as an alternative means of enhancing governance capacity during times of crisis, yet scholarly attention to their tenure stability within government cabinets remains limited. Drawing on cross-national ministerial appointment data from 30 European countries between 2000 and 2022, this article employs event history analysis (Kaplan–Meier estimates and stratified Cox models) to examine the risk of early exit among technocratic ministers during a government’s term. The findings show that technocrats are, on average, more likely than partisan ministers to leave office before the government’s termination. However, this vulnerability is conditional: it increases when populist parties are present in parliament, when the party system shows medium levels of fractionalization, and when technocrats hold high-salience portfolios such as finance, core social policy, or EU affairs. By contrast, Cabinet type and routine economic fluctuations are not robust predictors of technocratic turnover. The study shifts the focus of the technocracy literature from who is appointed to who endures, demonstrating that technical expertise alone does not ensure tenure stability. Rather, survival depends on partisan support, institutionalized coalition governance, and clear boundaries of accountability.