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<p>In recent decades, the influence of supranational institutions on national governments in Europe has considerably expanded, particularly in response to crises that have disrupted the progress of European integration and jeopardized political stability. Building on this research agenda, our study examines how supranational delegated oversight and supervision affect the appointment of technocratic personnel in national governments. We focus specifically on the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP), a mechanism designed to monitor and correct macroeconomic imbalances within member states. Using a comparative dataset covering 17 countries after the onset of the Eurozone’s economic and financial crisis, we conduct a series of regression analyses to assess the relationship between MIP severity and technocratic appointments. The results show that as MIP control becomes more stringent, national governments tend to include a higher share of technocrats, underscoring a growing dependence on expert-based personnel under conditions of supranational constraint. This study contributes to advancing comparative research on technocracy and its political drivers.</p>

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Macroeconomic imbalance procedure and technocratic appointments in national governments: insights from the Eurozone crisis

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年1月14日

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  • Sabrina Cavatorto,
  • Marco Improta,
  • Francesco Marangoni

摘要

In recent decades, the influence of supranational institutions on national governments in Europe has considerably expanded, particularly in response to crises that have disrupted the progress of European integration and jeopardized political stability. Building on this research agenda, our study examines how supranational delegated oversight and supervision affect the appointment of technocratic personnel in national governments. We focus specifically on the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP), a mechanism designed to monitor and correct macroeconomic imbalances within member states. Using a comparative dataset covering 17 countries after the onset of the Eurozone’s economic and financial crisis, we conduct a series of regression analyses to assess the relationship between MIP severity and technocratic appointments. The results show that as MIP control becomes more stringent, national governments tend to include a higher share of technocrats, underscoring a growing dependence on expert-based personnel under conditions of supranational constraint. This study contributes to advancing comparative research on technocracy and its political drivers.