<p>Extant evidence suggests that separating the role of board-chair from chief executive officer (CEO) enhances checks and balances of concentrated power of directors in a board and resultantly brings better economic outcomes. But, could a firm get equitable benefit from this separation if both supervisory and executive roles are converged into the two members of the same family (family–CEO duality)? Given this argument, we aim to investigate how family–CEO duality influences the performance of firms. We analyzed the longitudinal panel data from Bangladeshi firms using the two-step system generalized method of moment (GMM) estimate. Further to this, we followed the Hayes procedure for examining the mediating effect of production costs, operating expenses and asset utilization efficiency on the relationship between family–CEO duality and firm performance. Results indicate that family–CEO duality is negatively associated with firm performance, which is mediated through higher production costs and lower asset utilization efficiency.</p>