Food Aid Shocks and Food Insecurity: Does Democracy Matter?

This study investigates the relationship between negative food aid shocks, which occur when food aid falls sharply, and food insecurity. I theorize that democracy levels in aid-recipient countries are a crucial moderating factor. Political leaders in democratic countries can be held accountable electorally if they fail to quickly find alternative means of keeping the public fed when faced with a negative food aid shock. Conversely, authoritarian governments lack this electoral accountability mechanism and are, therefore, less likely to take steps to offset the impacts of aid shocks. Consistent with these expectations, my empirical findings suggest that democratic leaders shore up food security in response to negative food aid shocks, in contrast to authoritarians. This study contributes to the academic literature and offers insights for development practice by providing the first analysis of aid volatility and hunger, while clarifying how a country’s political system influences its ability to manage a crisis.