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<p>This case study investigates the collapse of Credit Suisse (CS), a globally systemically important bank (G-SIB), culminating in its state-brokered acquisition by UBS in March 2023. Employing a qualitative case study methodology using public secondary data (regulatory reports, company disclosures, investigation findings, academic literature, and grey literature), the study addresses how and why this failure occurred despite the post-GFC regulatory framework. Guided by an integrated framework (Agency Theory, Organizational Decline, Systemic Risk/Regulatory Effectiveness), the analysis identifies critical internal deficiencies as primary drivers. Findings highlight systemic risk management failures (Archegos, Greensill), persistent corporate governance weaknesses (leadership instability, accountability deficits, misaligned incentives), and strategic inconsistencies eroding resilience, consistent with organizational decline theories. These internal agency problems interacted with external pressures, including market contagion (SVB failure) and a fatal confidence loss, triggering a digital bank run. The study details the emergency Swiss intervention involving unprecedented liquidity support, bypassing standard protocols and controversially writing down AT1 capital while preserving equity. This deviation from the too big to fail (TBTF) playbook challenges resolution framework effectiveness for G-SIBs in crises, underscores addressing deep organizational pathologies beyond metrics, and reveals moral hazard and wealth transfer implications of the state-engineered rescue. The case offers key lessons for bank regulation, risk management, corporate governance, and AT1 bond treatment. Its main contribution is an integrated multi-theory framework that identifies a failure cascade and supervisory paradox overlooked by single-theory analyses.</p>

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The collapse of Credit Suisse: a case study in systemic failure and state-brokered rescue

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年5月16日

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  • Muneer Maher Alshater

摘要

This case study investigates the collapse of Credit Suisse (CS), a globally systemically important bank (G-SIB), culminating in its state-brokered acquisition by UBS in March 2023. Employing a qualitative case study methodology using public secondary data (regulatory reports, company disclosures, investigation findings, academic literature, and grey literature), the study addresses how and why this failure occurred despite the post-GFC regulatory framework. Guided by an integrated framework (Agency Theory, Organizational Decline, Systemic Risk/Regulatory Effectiveness), the analysis identifies critical internal deficiencies as primary drivers. Findings highlight systemic risk management failures (Archegos, Greensill), persistent corporate governance weaknesses (leadership instability, accountability deficits, misaligned incentives), and strategic inconsistencies eroding resilience, consistent with organizational decline theories. These internal agency problems interacted with external pressures, including market contagion (SVB failure) and a fatal confidence loss, triggering a digital bank run. The study details the emergency Swiss intervention involving unprecedented liquidity support, bypassing standard protocols and controversially writing down AT1 capital while preserving equity. This deviation from the too big to fail (TBTF) playbook challenges resolution framework effectiveness for G-SIBs in crises, underscores addressing deep organizational pathologies beyond metrics, and reveals moral hazard and wealth transfer implications of the state-engineered rescue. The case offers key lessons for bank regulation, risk management, corporate governance, and AT1 bond treatment. Its main contribution is an integrated multi-theory framework that identifies a failure cascade and supervisory paradox overlooked by single-theory analyses.