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<p>Driven by concerns over market concentration and tacit collusion, container shipping has come under increased regulatory pressure. Utilizing the New Empirical Industrial Organization method, this study evaluates the industry’s competitive evolution within the Trans-Pacific container shipping market across four distinct periods over an 11-year span covering the COVID-19 pandemic. Through the estimation of competition parameters and the Lerner Index, this study finds that, pre-pandemic, carrier behavior mirrored a Cournot oligopoly. Despite the unprecedented surge in freight rates during the pandemic, the analysis reveals an unexpected shift toward near-perfect competition, implying that record-high prices resulted from supply-side shocks and demand inelasticity rather than the deliberate exercise of market power. As market conditions normalized post-pandemic, the oligopolistic structure returned. Overall, empirical findings demonstrate that competition parameters remain consistently below unity, indicating that container shipping is not structurally prone to collusion. These results suggest a robust competitive landscape and provide empirical justification for the continued provision of antitrust immunity to shipping alliances.</p>

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Competition in container shipping: theoretical and empirical perspectives

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年7月23日

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  • Wei-Ming Wu

摘要

Driven by concerns over market concentration and tacit collusion, container shipping has come under increased regulatory pressure. Utilizing the New Empirical Industrial Organization method, this study evaluates the industry’s competitive evolution within the Trans-Pacific container shipping market across four distinct periods over an 11-year span covering the COVID-19 pandemic. Through the estimation of competition parameters and the Lerner Index, this study finds that, pre-pandemic, carrier behavior mirrored a Cournot oligopoly. Despite the unprecedented surge in freight rates during the pandemic, the analysis reveals an unexpected shift toward near-perfect competition, implying that record-high prices resulted from supply-side shocks and demand inelasticity rather than the deliberate exercise of market power. As market conditions normalized post-pandemic, the oligopolistic structure returned. Overall, empirical findings demonstrate that competition parameters remain consistently below unity, indicating that container shipping is not structurally prone to collusion. These results suggest a robust competitive landscape and provide empirical justification for the continued provision of antitrust immunity to shipping alliances.