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<p>To reduce pollution from the maritime industry, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has introduced the Carbon Intensity Indicator (CII) and related regulatory requirements. The implementation of the CII is expected to influence the structure of the chartering market and the decision-making processes of both shipowners and cargo owners. This will lead to a new market equilibrium and necessitate new approaches for analyzing and forecasting market behavior. This study examines the strategic interactions between shipowners and charterers under the CII regulations. It aims to identify the potential stable states of future markets, analyze the effects of key parameter changes, and offer relevant recommendations. To achieve this, a static mixed-strategy game model and a dynamic evolutionary game model are developed. Based on the results of model calculations and simulations, the following conclusions are drawn: 1) After long-term evolution, strategy combinations tend to cluster around the positions defined by the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. 2) Compared with other vessel types, shipowners and charterers in the Handysize bulk carrier market are more likely to disregard CII regulations in the steady state. 3) Excessive concessions or overly low penalties set by shipowners generally lead charterers to ignore speed restriction strategies.</p>

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Chartering game under carbon intensity indicator regulation

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年4月13日

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  • Shuhan Li,
  • Jingbo Yin,
  • Feiyang Ren

摘要

To reduce pollution from the maritime industry, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has introduced the Carbon Intensity Indicator (CII) and related regulatory requirements. The implementation of the CII is expected to influence the structure of the chartering market and the decision-making processes of both shipowners and cargo owners. This will lead to a new market equilibrium and necessitate new approaches for analyzing and forecasting market behavior. This study examines the strategic interactions between shipowners and charterers under the CII regulations. It aims to identify the potential stable states of future markets, analyze the effects of key parameter changes, and offer relevant recommendations. To achieve this, a static mixed-strategy game model and a dynamic evolutionary game model are developed. Based on the results of model calculations and simulations, the following conclusions are drawn: 1) After long-term evolution, strategy combinations tend to cluster around the positions defined by the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. 2) Compared with other vessel types, shipowners and charterers in the Handysize bulk carrier market are more likely to disregard CII regulations in the steady state. 3) Excessive concessions or overly low penalties set by shipowners generally lead charterers to ignore speed restriction strategies.