<p>We propose display slot auction mechanisms for brick-and-mortar retail stores under both single- and multiple-period settings to determine true market values for a currently private space. The proposed mechanisms belong to the first-price package auction family, and, unlike traditional auctions, consider not only the bid values in determining allocation, but also the intrinsic values to the retailer of the potentially displayed products. For the single-period case, we show that the winner determination problem (WDP) can be solved in polynomial time. For the multiple-period case, we show that the WDP is NP-hard by reducing a multiple-choice knapsack problem into it. Experiments using real-world data demonstrate significant benefits of the proposed auction mechanisms to a retailer.</p>

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Display slot auctions in brick-and-mortar retail stores

  • Alejandro Lim,
  • Lanshan Han,
  • Alvin Lim

摘要

We propose display slot auction mechanisms for brick-and-mortar retail stores under both single- and multiple-period settings to determine true market values for a currently private space. The proposed mechanisms belong to the first-price package auction family, and, unlike traditional auctions, consider not only the bid values in determining allocation, but also the intrinsic values to the retailer of the potentially displayed products. For the single-period case, we show that the winner determination problem (WDP) can be solved in polynomial time. For the multiple-period case, we show that the WDP is NP-hard by reducing a multiple-choice knapsack problem into it. Experiments using real-world data demonstrate significant benefits of the proposed auction mechanisms to a retailer.