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<p>This study examines how preference heterogeneity among stakeholders shapes institutional responsiveness in EU legislative decision-making. Drawing on an original dataset of 500 legislative proposals (2012–2022) and 5,561 consultation submissions, it tests three hypotheses regarding the influence of EU-level interest groups and non-state actors on Commission, Parliament, and Council positions. The findings show that EU interest group opposition is associated with higher levels of decision-maker disapproval, a pattern consistent with the claim that organized interests transmit consequential information and political signals across EU policy venues. By contrast, non-state group opposition has no statistically significant effect on Commission positioning in the models estimated here. Issue saliency appears to condition the relationship between preference heterogeneity and institutional responsiveness: heterogeneous stakeholder preferences are more strongly associated with institutional responsiveness when policy issues receive greater public visibility. These findings suggest that EU legislative responsiveness is conditional and venue-specific rather than uniformly pluralist or purely technocratic. The results contribute to debates on EU democratization by showing how public visibility may shape, but does not eliminate, representational asymmetries in supranational policy-making.</p>

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Responsiveness and interest representation in EU multilevel governance

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年7月27日

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  • Yuxuan Lei

摘要

This study examines how preference heterogeneity among stakeholders shapes institutional responsiveness in EU legislative decision-making. Drawing on an original dataset of 500 legislative proposals (2012–2022) and 5,561 consultation submissions, it tests three hypotheses regarding the influence of EU-level interest groups and non-state actors on Commission, Parliament, and Council positions. The findings show that EU interest group opposition is associated with higher levels of decision-maker disapproval, a pattern consistent with the claim that organized interests transmit consequential information and political signals across EU policy venues. By contrast, non-state group opposition has no statistically significant effect on Commission positioning in the models estimated here. Issue saliency appears to condition the relationship between preference heterogeneity and institutional responsiveness: heterogeneous stakeholder preferences are more strongly associated with institutional responsiveness when policy issues receive greater public visibility. These findings suggest that EU legislative responsiveness is conditional and venue-specific rather than uniformly pluralist or purely technocratic. The results contribute to debates on EU democratization by showing how public visibility may shape, but does not eliminate, representational asymmetries in supranational policy-making.