A three-legged race: assessing the functionality of consociational power-sharing with cabinet conflict-resolution data from Belgium (1979–2006)

Consociational democracy is a well-known recipe for managing divided societies, but critics have questioned the functionality of the power-sharing it prescribes. When different segments are forced to cooperate in a context of vetoes, elite cooperation and joint decision-making might be hard to achieve. But what does decision-making in power-sharing arrangements look like in practice? This study sheds light on the real-life functionality of consociational power-sharing as measured through the outcomes of conflicts (N = 328) in fifteen power-sharing cabinets in Belgium (1979–2006). Specifically, it assessess (1) how politicians (fail to) resolve conflicts, (2) how this evolved against the background of decentralization, and (3) whether ethno-territorial conflict-resolution is harder than non-ethno-territorial conflict-resolution. Different dimensions of functionality are discerned. The results provide a counterintuitive but nuanced view on power-sharing functionality, showing (1) that dysfunctionality levels vary depending on the indicator, (2) that power-sharing is not increasingly dysfunctional throughout time, and (3) that ethno-territorial conflict-resolution is not harder. The analyses add to contemporary debates on coalition politics, the paradox of federalism, and ethno-territorial politics.