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<p>Under the context of advancing high-quality development, intergovernmental collaboration, as a pivotal governance approach, has emerged as a critical pathway to facilitating cross-regional enterprise cooperation, optimizing resource allocation, and enhancing overall competitiveness. To clarify the evolutionary mechanisms and stability strategies of cross-regional enterprise cooperation behavior under intergovernmental collaboration, this paper builds a tripartite evolutionary game model featuring two cross-regional enterprises and intergovernmental collaborative bodies.Numerical simulations are conducted focusing on six dimensions: initial willingness to cooperate, changes in cross-regional enterprise cooperation income (<InlineEquation ID="IEq1"><EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\:{\Delta\:}R\)</EquationSource></InlineEquation>) and operational cost (<InlineEquation ID="IEq2"><EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\:{\Delta\:}C\)</EquationSource></InlineEquation>), default penalty intensity, and income distribution coefficient, interaction effect of variables and heterogeneity analysis. The main conclusions are: (1) A sufficiently high initial willingness of intergovernmental collaboration (<InlineEquation ID="IEq3"><EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\:x&gt;0.4\)</EquationSource></InlineEquation>) is a prerequisite for enterprise cooperation. (2) Net benefits of cooperation (<InlineEquation ID="IEq4"><EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\:{\Delta\:}R-{\Delta\:}C\)</EquationSource></InlineEquation>) make cooperation faster. (3) Default penalties have a critical threshold effect: below the threshold, cooperation collapses; above the threshold, cooperation becomes stable. (4) Fair division of benefits (<InlineEquation ID="IEq5"><EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\:\alpha\:\approx\:0.5\)</EquationSource></InlineEquation>) stimulates cooperation; large default penalty can to some extent make up for the unfairness of benefit distribution. (5) Asymmetric initial willingness between core and peripheral cities are overcome by strong intergovernmental cooperation.Based on these findings, targeted countermeasures to promote cross-regional enterprise cooperation are proposed.</p>

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Research on the impact mechanism of intergovernmental collaboration on cross-regional corporate cooperative behavior based on an evolutionary game analysis framework

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年5月6日

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  • Lei Mao,
  • Renjun Xu,
  • Jun Hu,
  • Yimiao Song,
  • Yingming Zhu

摘要

Under the context of advancing high-quality development, intergovernmental collaboration, as a pivotal governance approach, has emerged as a critical pathway to facilitating cross-regional enterprise cooperation, optimizing resource allocation, and enhancing overall competitiveness. To clarify the evolutionary mechanisms and stability strategies of cross-regional enterprise cooperation behavior under intergovernmental collaboration, this paper builds a tripartite evolutionary game model featuring two cross-regional enterprises and intergovernmental collaborative bodies.Numerical simulations are conducted focusing on six dimensions: initial willingness to cooperate, changes in cross-regional enterprise cooperation income (\(\:{\Delta\:}R\)) and operational cost (\(\:{\Delta\:}C\)), default penalty intensity, and income distribution coefficient, interaction effect of variables and heterogeneity analysis. The main conclusions are: (1) A sufficiently high initial willingness of intergovernmental collaboration (\(\:x>0.4\)) is a prerequisite for enterprise cooperation. (2) Net benefits of cooperation (\(\:{\Delta\:}R-{\Delta\:}C\)) make cooperation faster. (3) Default penalties have a critical threshold effect: below the threshold, cooperation collapses; above the threshold, cooperation becomes stable. (4) Fair division of benefits (\(\:\alpha\:\approx\:0.5\)) stimulates cooperation; large default penalty can to some extent make up for the unfairness of benefit distribution. (5) Asymmetric initial willingness between core and peripheral cities are overcome by strong intergovernmental cooperation.Based on these findings, targeted countermeasures to promote cross-regional enterprise cooperation are proposed.