<p>The Internet of Drones (IoD) is a network layer control system that manages the communication of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Drones have emerged as a novel approach to addressing everyday human challenges and are now used in a variety of domains, such as personal activities (e.g., photography and videography), urban applications (e.g., traffic monitoring and structural inspection), commercial operations (e.g., power line and tower inspection), agriculture, and military operations. Given the rapid growth of UAVs and their expanding applications, interconnecting drones to form an IoD is a desirable trend for enhancing flight safety and quality. However, challenges related to security, privacy, and inter-drone communication remain significant obstacles. Numerous authentication protocols have been developed to address these concerns. Recently, Zhang et al. proposed a PUF-based authentication scheme that uses unique identifiers and hash functions to secure authentication in the IoD environment. However, in this paper, we demonstrate that Zhang et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to several attacks, including secret value disclosure, integrity violation, key extraction, traceability, and anonymity violation. The presented attacks are shown to have a success probability of one. We also introduce two enhanced protocols that, through both informal and formal security proofs using the Scyther tool, demonstrate that they do not suffer from the vulnerabilities found in the earlier protocol. The communication costs of the proposed protocols (a) and (b) have increased by <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(29\%\)</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> and <InlineEquation ID="IEq2"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(59\%\)</EquationSource> </InlineEquation>, respectively, compared to the previous protocol. The computational costs for the proposed protocols (a) and (b) have also increased by <InlineEquation ID="IEq3"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(26\%\)</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> and <InlineEquation ID="IEq4"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(56\%\)</EquationSource> </InlineEquation>, respectively, while the storage costs in both proposed protocols remain unchanged compared to the previous protocol. It is true that the costs in the proposed protocols have risen; however, the previous design was vulnerable to various attacks, whereas the proposed protocols have demonstrated better security and have successfully achieved all their security objectives.</p>

Two secure authentication protocols for mitigating vulnerabilities in IoD

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2025年12月24日

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Masoumeh Safkhani,
Mahmoud Ghorbani Fard

摘要

The Internet of Drones (IoD) is a network layer control system that manages the communication of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Drones have emerged as a novel approach to addressing everyday human challenges and are now used in a variety of domains, such as personal activities (e.g., photography and videography), urban applications (e.g., traffic monitoring and structural inspection), commercial operations (e.g., power line and tower inspection), agriculture, and military operations. Given the rapid growth of UAVs and their expanding applications, interconnecting drones to form an IoD is a desirable trend for enhancing flight safety and quality. However, challenges related to security, privacy, and inter-drone communication remain significant obstacles. Numerous authentication protocols have been developed to address these concerns. Recently, Zhang et al. proposed a PUF-based authentication scheme that uses unique identifiers and hash functions to secure authentication in the IoD environment. However, in this paper, we demonstrate that Zhang et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to several attacks, including secret value disclosure, integrity violation, key extraction, traceability, and anonymity violation. The presented attacks are shown to have a success probability of one. We also introduce two enhanced protocols that, through both informal and formal security proofs using the Scyther tool, demonstrate that they do not suffer from the vulnerabilities found in the earlier protocol. The communication costs of the proposed protocols (a) and (b) have increased by \(29\%\) and \(59\%\) , respectively, compared to the previous protocol. The computational costs for the proposed protocols (a) and (b) have also increased by \(26\%\) and \(56\%\) , respectively, while the storage costs in both proposed protocols remain unchanged compared to the previous protocol. It is true that the costs in the proposed protocols have risen; however, the previous design was vulnerable to various attacks, whereas the proposed protocols have demonstrated better security and have successfully achieved all their security objectives.