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<p>Technological innovation serves as the core driving force for achieving sustainable and circular transportation systems. However, during the recycling process, consumers’ pro-social behavior such as willingness to return used batteries and support green initiatives, directly influences recycling rates and incentivizes recyclers to adopt advanced technologies. To explore this dynamic, this paper constructs a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) decision-making game model involving new energy vehicle (NEV) manufacturers, recyclers, and consumers, with a focus on power battery recycling. The study aims to investigate the impact of technological innovation subsidy and the level of consumers’ pro-social behavior on the innovation decisions of recycling agents. The findings reveal that: (1) Pro-social behavior significantly enhances the power battery recycling rate by increasing consumers’ willingness to participate in waste battery recycling and support green initiatives, thereby incentivizing recyclers to actively adopt technological innovations. (2) Both NEV manufacturers and power battery recyclers have a free-rider scenario in their technological innovations, and higher free-rider revenues will discourage both parties from technological innovations. (3) Greater subsidies can effectively promote the technological innovation of NEV manufacturers and recyclers, and manufacturers are more sensitive to government subsidies for technological innovation.</p>

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NEV battery recycling innovation strategy considering pro-social behavior from the game theory perspective

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年5月9日

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  • Yaoqun Xu,
  • Yi Zheng,
  • Nan Xu

摘要

Technological innovation serves as the core driving force for achieving sustainable and circular transportation systems. However, during the recycling process, consumers’ pro-social behavior such as willingness to return used batteries and support green initiatives, directly influences recycling rates and incentivizes recyclers to adopt advanced technologies. To explore this dynamic, this paper constructs a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) decision-making game model involving new energy vehicle (NEV) manufacturers, recyclers, and consumers, with a focus on power battery recycling. The study aims to investigate the impact of technological innovation subsidy and the level of consumers’ pro-social behavior on the innovation decisions of recycling agents. The findings reveal that: (1) Pro-social behavior significantly enhances the power battery recycling rate by increasing consumers’ willingness to participate in waste battery recycling and support green initiatives, thereby incentivizing recyclers to actively adopt technological innovations. (2) Both NEV manufacturers and power battery recyclers have a free-rider scenario in their technological innovations, and higher free-rider revenues will discourage both parties from technological innovations. (3) Greater subsidies can effectively promote the technological innovation of NEV manufacturers and recyclers, and manufacturers are more sensitive to government subsidies for technological innovation.