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<p>The question of whether large language models (LLMs) can exhibit moral capabilities is of growing interest and urgency, as these systems are deployed in sensitive roles such as companionship and medical advising, and will increasingly be tasked with making decisions and taking actions on behalf of humans. These trends require moving beyond evaluating for mere moral performance, the ability to produce morally appropriate outputs, to evaluating for moral competence, the ability to produce morally&#xa0;appropriate outputs based on morally relevant considerations. Assessing moral competence is critical for predicting future model behaviour, establishing appropriate public trust and justifying moral attributions. However, both the unique architectures of LLMs and the complexity of morality itself introduce fundamental challenges. Here we identify three such challenges: the facsimile problem, whereby models may imitate reasoning without genuine understanding; moral multidimensionality, whereby moral decisions are influenced by a range of context-sensitive relevant moral and non-moral considerations; and moral pluralism, which demands a new standard for globally&#xa0;deployed artificial intelligence. We provide a roadmap for tackling these challenges, advocating for a suite of adversarial and confirmatory evaluations that will enable us to work towards a more scientifically grounded understanding and, in turn, a more responsible attribution of moral competence to LLMs.</p>

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A roadmap for evaluating moral competence in large language models

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年2月18日

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  • Julia Haas,
  • Sophie Bridgers,
  • Arianna Manzini,
  • Benjamin Henke,
  • Joshua May,
  • Sydney Levine,
  • Laura Weidinger,
  • Murray Shanahan,
  • Kristian Lum,
  • Iason Gabriel,
  • William Isaac

摘要

The question of whether large language models (LLMs) can exhibit moral capabilities is of growing interest and urgency, as these systems are deployed in sensitive roles such as companionship and medical advising, and will increasingly be tasked with making decisions and taking actions on behalf of humans. These trends require moving beyond evaluating for mere moral performance, the ability to produce morally appropriate outputs, to evaluating for moral competence, the ability to produce morally appropriate outputs based on morally relevant considerations. Assessing moral competence is critical for predicting future model behaviour, establishing appropriate public trust and justifying moral attributions. However, both the unique architectures of LLMs and the complexity of morality itself introduce fundamental challenges. Here we identify three such challenges: the facsimile problem, whereby models may imitate reasoning without genuine understanding; moral multidimensionality, whereby moral decisions are influenced by a range of context-sensitive relevant moral and non-moral considerations; and moral pluralism, which demands a new standard for globally deployed artificial intelligence. We provide a roadmap for tackling these challenges, advocating for a suite of adversarial and confirmatory evaluations that will enable us to work towards a more scientifically grounded understanding and, in turn, a more responsible attribution of moral competence to LLMs.