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<p>In the field of quantum communication, investigating the practical security of systems is conducive to their deployments in real-world scenarios. In this paper, we identify and experimentally demonstrate a side-channel vulnerability within continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) arising from the zero-order hold (ZOH) effect in digital-to-analog conversion. As digital-to-analog converters (DACs) are indispensable for modulation in CV-QKD transmitters, this leakage constitutes an intrinsic and widespread risk. We show that the ZOH-induced spectral side lobes allow an eavesdropper to extract secret information without disturbing the main signal band. Experimental validation on a CV-QKD platform reveals a leakage of 2.68 Mbit/s against a generated secret key rate of 4.73 Mbit/s. Crucially, we propose a defense strategy that completely eliminates this vulnerability, effectively restoring the system’s implementation security. By resolving this fundamental hardware limitation, our work bridges the gap between theoretical models and practical engineering, paving the way for robust, standardized quantum communication networks.</p>

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Continuous-variable quantum key distribution with a leakage from digital-to-analog conversion

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2026年6月25日

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  • Xu Liu,
  • Jinghan Sun,
  • Tao Wang,
  • Peng Huang,
  • Guihua Zeng

摘要

In the field of quantum communication, investigating the practical security of systems is conducive to their deployments in real-world scenarios. In this paper, we identify and experimentally demonstrate a side-channel vulnerability within continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) arising from the zero-order hold (ZOH) effect in digital-to-analog conversion. As digital-to-analog converters (DACs) are indispensable for modulation in CV-QKD transmitters, this leakage constitutes an intrinsic and widespread risk. We show that the ZOH-induced spectral side lobes allow an eavesdropper to extract secret information without disturbing the main signal band. Experimental validation on a CV-QKD platform reveals a leakage of 2.68 Mbit/s against a generated secret key rate of 4.73 Mbit/s. Crucially, we propose a defense strategy that completely eliminates this vulnerability, effectively restoring the system’s implementation security. By resolving this fundamental hardware limitation, our work bridges the gap between theoretical models and practical engineering, paving the way for robust, standardized quantum communication networks.