Scholarlink

<p>Nonergodicity and Simpson’s paradox present significant, yet underappreciated challenges in cognitive neuroscience. Leveraging brain imaging and behavioral data from over 4000 individuals and a Bayesian computational model of cognitive dynamics, we investigated brain-behavior relationships underlying cognitive control at both between-subjects and within-subjects levels. Strikingly, brain-behavior associations reversed across levels of analysis, revealing pervasive nonergodicity. Within-subjects analysis uncovered dissociated neural representations of reactive and proactive control and revealed that individuals who adaptively versus maladaptively regulated cognitive control exhibited distinct brain-behavior associations. Our findings demonstrate that between-subjects analyses can fundamentally mischaracterize within-individuals mechanisms, as group-level patterns not only disagreed with individual-level patterns but often reversed them. This work highlights the necessity of distinguishing between-subjects and within-subjects inferences in neuroscience, with implications for understanding cognitive mechanisms and designing personalized interventions.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

Nonergodicity and Simpson’s paradox in neurocognitive dynamics of cognitive control

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2026年4月27日

查看全文
  • Percy K. Mistry,
  • Nicholas K. Branigan,
  • Zhiyao Gao,
  • Weidong Cai,
  • Vinod Menon

摘要

Nonergodicity and Simpson’s paradox present significant, yet underappreciated challenges in cognitive neuroscience. Leveraging brain imaging and behavioral data from over 4000 individuals and a Bayesian computational model of cognitive dynamics, we investigated brain-behavior relationships underlying cognitive control at both between-subjects and within-subjects levels. Strikingly, brain-behavior associations reversed across levels of analysis, revealing pervasive nonergodicity. Within-subjects analysis uncovered dissociated neural representations of reactive and proactive control and revealed that individuals who adaptively versus maladaptively regulated cognitive control exhibited distinct brain-behavior associations. Our findings demonstrate that between-subjects analyses can fundamentally mischaracterize within-individuals mechanisms, as group-level patterns not only disagreed with individual-level patterns but often reversed them. This work highlights the necessity of distinguishing between-subjects and within-subjects inferences in neuroscience, with implications for understanding cognitive mechanisms and designing personalized interventions.