<p>Increasing belief in climate change is often considered a prerequisite to motivating climate action. However, partisan polarization has crystallized climate beliefs, and the narrowing window for climate mitigation demands urgent behavior change. This study investigates whether messages from co-partisan elected officials can directly boost intentions to adopt climate-friendly behaviors without changing underlying beliefs about climate change. In two preregistered survey experiments—one on solar panels (<i>n</i> = 9298) and one on electric vehicles (<i>n</i> = 9903)—I find that co-partisan elite messages can increase climate-mitigation intentions among self-reported Republicans and Democrats alike, even though such messages do not affect climate beliefs. Furthermore, I find that messages centering climate change are just as persuasive for Republicans as non-climate framings, challenging previous work showing that climate change rhetoric triggers a “backfire effect” reducing Republicans’ mitigation behaviors. Finally, I test the theory of “credibility-enhancing displays” and find limited evidence that partisan elites are more effective at motivating mitigation intentions when they themselves engage in those behaviors.</p>

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Messages from co-partisan elected officials can increase climate mitigation intentions without changing climate beliefs

  • Victor Y. Wu

摘要

Increasing belief in climate change is often considered a prerequisite to motivating climate action. However, partisan polarization has crystallized climate beliefs, and the narrowing window for climate mitigation demands urgent behavior change. This study investigates whether messages from co-partisan elected officials can directly boost intentions to adopt climate-friendly behaviors without changing underlying beliefs about climate change. In two preregistered survey experiments—one on solar panels (n = 9298) and one on electric vehicles (n = 9903)—I find that co-partisan elite messages can increase climate-mitigation intentions among self-reported Republicans and Democrats alike, even though such messages do not affect climate beliefs. Furthermore, I find that messages centering climate change are just as persuasive for Republicans as non-climate framings, challenging previous work showing that climate change rhetoric triggers a “backfire effect” reducing Republicans’ mitigation behaviors. Finally, I test the theory of “credibility-enhancing displays” and find limited evidence that partisan elites are more effective at motivating mitigation intentions when they themselves engage in those behaviors.