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<p>The return of the Taliban to power in August 2021 has compelled Central Asian states to reevaluate their security risks-connectivity ambition balance in the circumstances of contested recognition. This study analyzed the case of pragmatic non-recognition of Kazakhstan, in which a non-frontline middle power extends functional cooperation while intentionally refraining from granting diplomatic recognition. It brings recognition theory into dialogue with the literature on middle power diplomacy and Eurasian connectivity, conceptualizing pragmatic non-recognition as a repertoire of statecraft and advancing three propositions about likely behavior: multilateralized security hedging, incremental, risk-managed connectivity, and legal-technical engagement without recognition. Empirically, the study draws on documentary analysis, original estimates of bilateral trade patterns, eight semi-structured elite interviews with Afghan and Kazakh regional actors, and nine expert survey responses from Afghanistan and Pakistan, combined through thematic coding and process tracing. The analysis shows how Kazakhstan uses the CSTO and SCO frameworks to manage security externalities, relies on high-volume but reversible commodity trade and cautious participation in Trans-Afghan corridor initiatives, and deploys domestic delisting, special-ambassador diplomacy, and UN-facilitated talks to deepen cooperation while maintaining formal non-recognition.</p>

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Pragmatic nonrecognition as middle power statecraft in Kazakhstan’s engagement with Taliban ruled Afghanistan

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年7月1日

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  • Leila Delovarova,
  • Bilal Naqib Jan

摘要

The return of the Taliban to power in August 2021 has compelled Central Asian states to reevaluate their security risks-connectivity ambition balance in the circumstances of contested recognition. This study analyzed the case of pragmatic non-recognition of Kazakhstan, in which a non-frontline middle power extends functional cooperation while intentionally refraining from granting diplomatic recognition. It brings recognition theory into dialogue with the literature on middle power diplomacy and Eurasian connectivity, conceptualizing pragmatic non-recognition as a repertoire of statecraft and advancing three propositions about likely behavior: multilateralized security hedging, incremental, risk-managed connectivity, and legal-technical engagement without recognition. Empirically, the study draws on documentary analysis, original estimates of bilateral trade patterns, eight semi-structured elite interviews with Afghan and Kazakh regional actors, and nine expert survey responses from Afghanistan and Pakistan, combined through thematic coding and process tracing. The analysis shows how Kazakhstan uses the CSTO and SCO frameworks to manage security externalities, relies on high-volume but reversible commodity trade and cautious participation in Trans-Afghan corridor initiatives, and deploys domestic delisting, special-ambassador diplomacy, and UN-facilitated talks to deepen cooperation while maintaining formal non-recognition.