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<p>In this paper, we conceptualize parking in urban areas as a matching problem. We begin by formulating street parking behavior as a strategic game and develop a matching framework for this scenario. We demonstrate that the set of Nash equilibria in the parking game directly corresponds to the set of stable outcomes in the associated matching problem. Subsequently, we propose a centralized mechanism designed to allocate available parking spaces to drivers in a stable manner, facilitated through a digital platform, such as a mobile application. This mechanism can accommodate various practical needs by establishing a priority structure that may include distance priority, price priority, or resident priority.</p>

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Digital parking assignment: matching mechanism design approach

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年1月6日

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  • Jinyong Jeong

摘要

In this paper, we conceptualize parking in urban areas as a matching problem. We begin by formulating street parking behavior as a strategic game and develop a matching framework for this scenario. We demonstrate that the set of Nash equilibria in the parking game directly corresponds to the set of stable outcomes in the associated matching problem. Subsequently, we propose a centralized mechanism designed to allocate available parking spaces to drivers in a stable manner, facilitated through a digital platform, such as a mobile application. This mechanism can accommodate various practical needs by establishing a priority structure that may include distance priority, price priority, or resident priority.