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<p>In the <i>Guide</i>, Maimonides argues that Providence pertains to irrational animals only in terms of their species. This claim is criticized later by Thomas Aquinas for implying that Providence does not pertain immediately to singular individuals. While Aquinas’ approach is arguably not as distinct from Maimonides as might appear, Aquinas does not address what seems to be the Maimonides’ motivation: that animals suffer blamelessly and cannot benefit from their suffering. Aquinas’ approach to the place of non-human animals in Providence appears to be lacking, as he apparently holds a principle that animals are valuable only in terms of their usefulness to human life, and that natural evils (including the suffering of animals) are instrumentally necessary for biological goods. There are well-known reasons in the literature to question whether these responses are satisfactory. My paper will outline a theodicy for animal suffering that moves beyond Aquinas and Maimonides, but incorporates elements from the theories of both, arguing that animal suffering has a role in God’s Providence where the life of each animal is of intrinsic value, and where their suffering was not necessary for biological life. Rather, their suffering takes on a sacrificial aspect in a fallen world harmed by idolatry.</p>

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Animal suffering from Rabbi Moses to Aquinas and beyond

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年8月4日

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  • James Dominic Rooney

摘要

In the Guide, Maimonides argues that Providence pertains to irrational animals only in terms of their species. This claim is criticized later by Thomas Aquinas for implying that Providence does not pertain immediately to singular individuals. While Aquinas’ approach is arguably not as distinct from Maimonides as might appear, Aquinas does not address what seems to be the Maimonides’ motivation: that animals suffer blamelessly and cannot benefit from their suffering. Aquinas’ approach to the place of non-human animals in Providence appears to be lacking, as he apparently holds a principle that animals are valuable only in terms of their usefulness to human life, and that natural evils (including the suffering of animals) are instrumentally necessary for biological goods. There are well-known reasons in the literature to question whether these responses are satisfactory. My paper will outline a theodicy for animal suffering that moves beyond Aquinas and Maimonides, but incorporates elements from the theories of both, arguing that animal suffering has a role in God’s Providence where the life of each animal is of intrinsic value, and where their suffering was not necessary for biological life. Rather, their suffering takes on a sacrificial aspect in a fallen world harmed by idolatry.