<p>Ugly things are everywhere—a vulgar dress, a messy room, a gaudy performance, or an awkward pronunciation. Like beautiful items, ugly items give us aesthetic reasons to respond in some way. One natural explanation for this reason-giving nature is that ugliness matters because displeasure matters. In this paper, however, I argue that aesthetic reasons to deal with ugliness cannot be reduced to hedonistic reasons to minimize displeasure and require an alternative explanation. Displeasure-based accounts fail to explain the fact that even an insensitive subject, who feels no displeasure toward an ugly item, might still have a good reason to deal with it. I argue that ugliness matters not only because displeasure matters, but also because defects matter. Defects, understood as features that render items as deviating from relevant norms, ground a specific kind of ugliness: relative ugliness. By appealing to the ideas of natural normativity and its derivation, I demonstrate that anyone has reason to minimize defects underlying such an ugliness.</p>