<p>The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of determining the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and the brain. The problem is hard because there are strong independent arguments, respectively, pushing toward and against the view that consciousness is entirely physical. Physicalism is an elegant view of reality which seems to be the best metaphysics of science and is supported by the causal closure argument concerning the causal role of mentality in the physical world. Yet it seems that a complete scientific account of consciousness, which would explain why it arises and allow anyone with enough scientific knowledge to infer all of its features, is impossible. Russellian physicalism has been proposed as a way out of this impasse. This view posits nonmental categorical properties which are both left out of science and which are necessary to ground consciousness and, in this way, seems to satisfy the motivations of both physicalists and nonphysicalists. If Russellian physicalism is coherent and can satisfy all serious nonphysicalist intuitions, then the hard problem is solved, since nonphysicalist options could be taken off the table in favor of only considering Russellian physicalism (which satisfies nonphysicalist intuitions) or some sort of physicalist error theory (which explains why nonphysicalist intuitions are misguided). Here, I will defend this position and argue that Russellian physicalism can satisfy all serious nonphysicalist intuitions, including intuitions underlying standard antiphysicalist epistemic arguments and intuitions underlying the “no-gap” argument concerning indeterminacy of consciousness. I will also argue that other nonphysicalist intuitions are not philosophically serious.&#xa0;</p>