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<p>Jeff Sebo’s book <i>The Moral Circle</i>, starting from the rejection of anthropological exceptionalism, proposes a radical expansion of moral consideration to insects (possibly even microbes) and AI systems. Confronting the reasons for this position, and in particular the argument based on <i>functions</i> and that based on the <i>probabilistic assessment</i> of what <i>might</i> matter, allows us to focus on issues such as the balance between <i>equal</i> and <i>differentiated</i> consideration and the intertwining of different factors that can make choices and responsibilities more complex and challenging. A crucial question emerges: does entering the moral circle as we know it presuppose reference—and to what extent—to the evidence and experience of <i>embodied</i> agency and responsibility?</p>

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Expanding the “moral circle”. How far?

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年3月30日

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  • Stefano Semplici

摘要

Jeff Sebo’s book The Moral Circle, starting from the rejection of anthropological exceptionalism, proposes a radical expansion of moral consideration to insects (possibly even microbes) and AI systems. Confronting the reasons for this position, and in particular the argument based on functions and that based on the probabilistic assessment of what might matter, allows us to focus on issues such as the balance between equal and differentiated consideration and the intertwining of different factors that can make choices and responsibilities more complex and challenging. A crucial question emerges: does entering the moral circle as we know it presuppose reference—and to what extent—to the evidence and experience of embodied agency and responsibility?