<p>As a novel approach to the hard problem of consciousness, externalist theories posit that conscious experiences are partially or entirely constituted by extracranial processes or properties. However, such approaches face significant explanatory challenges when accounting for dreaming experiences, which appear—based on both common-sense understanding and the prevailing paradigm in neuroscience—to be entirely endogenous phenomena originating within the brain. Riccardo Manzotti’s radical externalist theory of consciousness, which asserts that conscious experiences are nothing more than extracranial objects existing in the environment, offers an intriguing solution to the dream problem by proposing that dreaming consists essentially in delayed perceptual experiences. However, this article argues that Manzotti’s proposal does not provide a fully satisfactory resolution, as it fails to account for the bodily experiences reported in the dreams of individuals with congenital physical impairments. Furthermore, it is contended that such dream-based bodily experiences also pose substantial difficulties for the internalist framework of neuroscience, which regards conscious experience as exclusively rooted in intracranial neural activity. In light of this theoretical impasse, this article tentatively proposes a sketchy alternative: Manzotti’s radical externalist proposal—that conscious experience is wholly situated in spacetime external to the brain—requires critical revision. Specifically, it is necessary to acknowledge that neural activities within the brain play a partial constitutive role in the formation of conscious experience.</p>