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<p><i>The</i><i> Tr</i><i>ue and the Good</i> addresses the Problem of Truth’s Value: Why ought we to care about truth? It focuses on how Aristotelian views, which treat truth as a non-normative property (e.g., correspondence theory or deflationism), can answer this problem. Wrenn proposes a state-given account called “Strong Virtue Theory.” It maintains that we morally ought to care about truth because Truthfulness is a moral virtue that promotes overall good. In this paper, I examine a possible problem for Strong Virtue Theory that is related to desiring “pointless truths”—such as the truth about the exact number of blades of grass in a backyard. Wrenn discusses pointless truths in Chapter 6 as a challenge to (what I will call) the “intrinsic value view”—the view that we ought to care about truth <i>because it is intrinsically valuable</i> (Section 2). However, a similar issue confronts Wrenn’s view, i.e., whether desiring pointless truths is Truthful (Section 3). Wrenn considers two possible responses—one that permits the desire for pointless truths as Truthful and one that does not. However, both responses face serious problems. This analysis reveals a difficulty for Strong Virtue Theory (Section 4).</p>

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Is a person who desires pointless truths truthful?

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年3月9日

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  • Tamaki Komada

摘要

The True and the Good addresses the Problem of Truth’s Value: Why ought we to care about truth? It focuses on how Aristotelian views, which treat truth as a non-normative property (e.g., correspondence theory or deflationism), can answer this problem. Wrenn proposes a state-given account called “Strong Virtue Theory.” It maintains that we morally ought to care about truth because Truthfulness is a moral virtue that promotes overall good. In this paper, I examine a possible problem for Strong Virtue Theory that is related to desiring “pointless truths”—such as the truth about the exact number of blades of grass in a backyard. Wrenn discusses pointless truths in Chapter 6 as a challenge to (what I will call) the “intrinsic value view”—the view that we ought to care about truth because it is intrinsically valuable (Section 2). However, a similar issue confronts Wrenn’s view, i.e., whether desiring pointless truths is Truthful (Section 3). Wrenn considers two possible responses—one that permits the desire for pointless truths as Truthful and one that does not. However, both responses face serious problems. This analysis reveals a difficulty for Strong Virtue Theory (Section 4).