<p>By appealing to the Rawlsian maximin criterion, Catriona McKinnon’s “Playing Safe Argument” argues that we should take precautionary actions against climate change when the outcome of climate change is strongly uncertain. I argue that the Playing Safe Argument fails for three reasons. First, contrary to what McKinnon claims, the worst consequence of not taking precautionary action is not necessarily worse than the worst consequences of taking precautionary action, since the precautionary action may possibly fail. Second, our uncertainty about the consequences of climate change may not be strong enough to justify the use of the maximin criterion. Third, the Rawlsian theory is concerned with the situation of the least-advantaged rather than the population as a whole. Since the position of the worst-off may not be significantly changed whether or not precautionary actions were taken. Rawls’s maximin criterion does not unambiguously justify the Strong Precautionary Principle.</p>